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Corporate Social Responsibility: A Law &
Economics Perspective
Jonathan R. Macey*
INTRODUCTION
The law and economics of corporate social responsibility are
simple. Assets are worth more to their owners if they are held
exclusively by those owners rather than shared. This simple fact
explains why shareholders prefer to be the exclusive beneficiaries
of corporate fiduciary duties. If, however, the rules of the game
were changed and corporations were deemed to have
responsibilities to society in general, instead of exclusively to
their shareholders, the shareholders would be harmed because
the economic value of their shares would decline. Of course,
shareholders would agree to a change such that corporations
owed duties to society rather than to the shareholders exclusively
if they were compensated for this diminution in rights. Thus, if
non-shareholder constituencies such as local communities,
workers, suppliers, or customers valued these rights sufficiently,
they would have them because they would buy them from the
shareholders. The fact that this does not happen is strong
evidence that it is efficient to organize corporations such that
they are run so as to maximize value for shareholders.
From a law and economics perspective, the corporate social
responsibility debate is really a debate about how to interpret the
contracts and understandings that allocate rights and
responsibilities within corporations and other forms of business
organizations (hereinafter ―corporations‖), and between
corporations and those located outside of the corporation, such as
local communities. The ineluctable reality is that when
shareholders make investments in a corporation, they do not
think that they are giving their money away. Rather, they invest
* Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance, and Securities Law,
Yale Law School. This Article‘s content draws in substantial part from, and includes
revisions and extensions of arguments in, earlier articles, including, for example,
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual
Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, FirmSpecific Capital Investments and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate
Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173 (1989); and Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of
the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate
Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991).
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on the premise that they have the right to receive something in
exchange for their investments. To say that corporations are
supposed to be managed to maximize shareholder value is simply
to recognize that part of the reciprocal promise made by the
corporation in exchange for the investment is an agreement that
the corporation will be managed for the benefit of the
shareholders.
From this very basic perspective comes the insight that the
fiduciary duties that officers and directors owe to shareholders
simply reflect a central term of the standard form contract
created when a corporation issues shares: the corporation is
promising that the business will be run to maximize returns for
shareholders. While there is some confusion on this subject, this
basic contract is entirely mutable in every detail. In other words,
it is the default rule that is in place unless the corporation, at its
inception, chooses to make a different set of commitments to
investors.
It is not entirely clear that fiduciary duties are particularly
valuable assets. The fervor of the corporate social responsibility
debate suggests that having the shareholders‘ right to have the
corporation managed for their exclusive benefit, as opposed to the
benefit of all stakeholders, including non-shareholder
constituencies, must be worth something. Otherwise, it would not
be worth fighting over.
The interests of the widely variegated groups of claimants on
firms‘ assets conflict in numerous ways. By strengthening the
bargaining position of one group, the law inevitably weakens the
bargaining position of the other competing groups.
Building on the axiom that the corporation is a nexus of
contracts,1 fiduciary duties are simply corporate assets that are
bargained for and auctioned off among the various groups of
stakeholders. The bargaining process theoretically could lead to a
wide variety of outcomes.
As long as the parties engaged in the bargaining process are
rational, however, they will agree to stipulate that fiduciary
duties will be exclusively enjoyed by one constituency, if the
value of such duties is greater when enjoyed exclusively than
when shared with other groups. Thus, the allocation of fiduciary
duties exclusively to one group of claimants does not reflect any
lack of bargaining power on the part of the groups that do not
enjoy the privilege of being the beneficiary of such duties. Rather,
1 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393 (1937) (―A firm,
therefore, consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when the
direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur.‖).
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I argue that these other groups benefit by giving up any claims
they might have on such rights by more than they lose.
The benefits will vary depending on the nature of the nonshareholder constituency at issue. They may take the form of
higher interest rates for bondholders, higher wages or greater job
security for workers, or higher taxes for local communities. Thus,
the notion of forbidding companies from offering a standard form
contract in which shareholders are the exclusive beneficiaries of
fiduciary duties and requiring firms to allow directors to serve
broad societal interests will not only make shareholders worse
off, they make other constituencies worse off as well.
For over a century, state corporate law doctrine provided
that the directors of both public and closely held firms owe
fiduciary duties to shareholders and to shareholders alone. The
applicable legal norm required directors to manage a corporation
for the exclusive benefit of its shareholders. Protection for other
sorts of claimants existed only to the extent provided by contract.
This principle has been subjected to sustained attack.2
I argue that fiduciary duties should flow to residual
claimants and to residual claimants alone. This conclusion stems
from a contractual analysis, under which residual claimants
receive the benefits of fiduciary duties, not because other groups
do not value them, but rather because (1) the aggregate value of
fiduciary duties to any group within a firm diminishes as those
rights are shared with other groups; and (2) the shareholders
value these rights more than any other group.
Non-shareholder constituencies also value these rights. It
would be surprising indeed if rights were of value to one group
but not to another group, just as it would be surprising if the
rights were of exactly the same value to every group. The very
nature of the interests and contractual claims of non-shareholder
constituencies makes it easier for these constituencies to protect
themselves from post-contractual opportunism by the firm. In
addition, non-shareholder constituencies already enjoy the
protection provided by judicial gap-filling and do not need the
additional gap-filling protections afforded by fiduciary duties. All
groups ultimately benefit from a legal regime that makes
shareholders the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties.
A valid criticism leveled at other constituency statutes
is that they require corporate agents to serve so
2 See, e.g., Comm. on Corporate Laws, Am. Bar Ass‘n, Other Constituencies Statutes:
Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2253 (1990) (criticizing other constituencies
statutes for carrying the potential to change basic premises of corporate law).
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many
masters—employees,
communities,
bondholders,
customers, suppliers—that the costs in terms of confusion and
misunderstanding on the part of courts and litigants vastly
outweigh any potential benefits that such statutes might provide.
But this argument is not dispositive of the debate because it
ignores the fact that corporations have long been able to issue
multiple classes of shares with different economic and political
rights, and corporate management has owed fiduciary duties to
each of these classes. Thus, it simply cannot be said that
corporate
law is incapable of reconciling the claims of a
variety of competing interests. The argument that other
constituency statutes will cause confusion also neglects the fact
that most managers‘ actions are insulated from judicial secondguessing by the business judgment rule. Accordingly, as a
practical matter, the rights being taken away from shareholders
by other constituency statutes were not rights that provided
much in the way of concrete benefits for shareholders in the first
place.
Interestingly, over a significant range of important corporate
decisions, other constituencies such as fixed claimants or workers
may actually have the greatest stake in the decisions being
made. For example, shareholders may well benefit by a corporate
decision to close a particular plant, but the workers who would
lose their jobs in that plant closing likely would suffer to a much
greater extent.
Similarly, other constituency statutes cannot be condemned
on the grounds that they upset a system of legal rules that
present a pre-existing set of clearly defined behavioral guidelines
for officers and directors. No such set of guidelines exists.
Rather, the critical problem with other constituency statutes
is that they fail to recognize that fiduciary duties are owed solely
to residual claimants because they are the group that faces the
most severe set of contracting problems with respect to defining
the nature and extent of the obligations owed to them by officers
and directors. Fiduciary duties should properly be seen as a
method of gap-filling in incomplete contracts. And shareholders
place a far greater value on the protection provided by
this gap-filling than do the other constituencies of a corporation.
This observation, of course, raises an obvious follow-up
question: if gap-filling is a useful device from the shareholders‘
perspective, why not from the perspective of these other
constituencies as well? Here I argue that under modern
principles of contract law, courts do fill in gaps for these other
constituencies, but they do so against the background of the pre-
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existing contracts that these groups have with the firm. Thus,
gap-filling on behalf of such other constituencies as employees
and bondholders is done in the context of interpreting the
employment contracts, collective bargaining agreements, bond
indentures, and covenants that these other groups have with the
corporation. Necessary gap-filling is achieved in this context.
The obvious exception to this general rule comes from the
local communities in which large corporations operate. Unlike
the rest of the constituencies with which a firm deals, the local
community has no preexisting agreement with the firm. As such,
there simply is no gap for a court to fill. However, the local
community is, or should be, well represented in the political
process. Any grievance felt by the local community is best
addressed to local political officials.
Finally, this paper considers—and rejects—the argument
that other constituency statutes are worthwhile because they
prevent inefficient wealth transfers from other constituencies,
particularly bondholders and employees, to shareholders. The
question is not whether such wealth transfers are theoretically
possible, because they clearly are. Rather, the relevant issues are
(1) whether the dangers associated with such wealth transfers
can be avoided by contractually negotiated covenants between
the fixed claimants and the firm; and (2) whether the social costs
of attempting to mitigate this wealth transfer problem through
the promulgation of other constituency statutes are greater than
the social benefits. The answer to both of these questions is yes.
It seems patently clear that the actual purpose and effect of these
statutes is to benefit a single non-shareholder constituency,
namely the top managers of publicly held corporations who want
still another weapon in their arsenal of anti-takeover protective
devices. In other words, like many other legislative initiatives,
other constituency statutes do not benefit the interests or groups
that they ostensibly are intended to benefit. Rather, such
statutes benefit a well-organized, highly influential specialinterest group, namely the top managers of large, publicly held
corporations who wish to terminate the market for corporate
control.
I. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND RESIDUAL CLAIMANTS
Other constituency statutes and other efforts to require
corporations to shift their focus from shareholders to society are
inconsistent with the fact that shareholders‘ expectations of
being the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties are legitimate
because this is what they have contracted and paid for. This
argument derives from the insight of modern financial theory
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that ―shareholders retain plenary authority to guide the fate of
the corporate enterprise because . . . they have the greatest stake
in the outcome of corporate decision-making . . . .‖3 Despite the
fact that corporations are merely complex webs of contractual
relations—and despite the fact that shareholders do not ―own‖
the modern, publicly held firm in any meaningful sense—the
ultimate right to guide the firm (or, more precisely, to have it
guided on their behalf) is retained by the shareholders because
they are the group that values it most highly.4
The implication of this analysis for the allocation of fiduciary
responsibilities within the firm is not entirely clear. To say that
shareholders place the highest value on the rights protected by
fiduciary duties is not the same as saying that shareholders are
the only group that values such rights. Clearly, many
discretionary decisions within the corporation harm the rights of
other claimants. For example, in recent years corporations have:
(1) ―[r]edeem[ed] refunding-protected debt with proceeds of an
equity offering, while at the same time borrowing for other
corporate purposes at‖ lower interest rates;5 (2) ―[d]eliberately
engineer[ed] a technical default in a private debt covenant, in
order to be ‗forced‘ to retire a high coupon issue that was
otherwise fully call-protected‖;6 (3) ―[b]orrow[ed] heavily in the
short-term market, [and] then offer[ed] bondholders a choice
between amending a covenant limitation on funded debt or
leaving the issuer severely exposed to interest rate fluctuations
and burdened with large near-term maturities‖;7 and (4)
―[l]everag[ed] . . . [their capital structure] to avoid a hostile
takeover, thereby triggering a decline in the company‘s bond
rating . . . , notwithstanding the bondholders‘ longstanding
assumption that the issuer desired to maintain the highest
possible rating in order to minimize its borrowing costs.‖8
Thus, the interesting question is not why shareholders
receive the benefits of fiduciary duties, but why they should be
the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties, given that other
constituencies would benefit if they had the rights created by the
imposition of such duties. But why would shareholders, as
residual claimants, place the highest value on fiduciary duties?

3 Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the
Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 175 (1989).
4 Id.
5 Martin S. Fridson, Bondholder Rights: A Survey of Current Issues, EXTRA CREDIT:
THE JOURNAL OF HIGH YIELD BOND RESEARCH, Jan.–Feb. 1992, at 33.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 34.
8 Id.
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After all, once we accept the view that the firm is not an entity at
all but a set of contracts or series of bargains:
[The organization] . . . decomposes . . . into a group of identifiable
participants—e.g., investors, managers, creditors, employees and
suppliers—who negotiate an equilibrium position among themselves.
An implication of this perspective is to deny that any one class of
participants (i.e., the shareholders) have a natural right to view
themselves as owners of the firm. Rather, shareholders are seen not
as the firm‘s owners, but as suppliers of equity capital; they are the
‗residual claimants,‘ who bring to the firm their special ability at riskbearing, which creditors, managers, and employees tend to lack.9

Of course, ―[o]nce we view the shareholders as simply the
residual claimants who have agreed to accept a more
uncertain . . . return because of their superior risk-bearing
capacity, it is far from self-evident that they are necessarily
entitled to control the firm,‖10 that is, to have managers‘ and
directors‘ fiduciary duties flow exclusively to them.
The rationale for why shareholders place the highest value
on such rights is said to be that,
[u]niquely, the residual claimants . . . are interested in the firm‘s
overall profitability, whereas creditors and managers [and
presumably other constituents as well] are essentially fixed claimants
who wish only to see their claims repaid and who will logically tend to
resist risky activities. Having less interest in the overall economic
performance of the firm, creditors can bargain through contract and
do not need representation on the board to monitor all aspects of the
firm‘s performance.11

Thus, fiduciary duties exist because the decisions that face
officers and directors of corporations are sufficiently complex and
difficult to predict. It would therefore not be feasible to specify, in
advance, how such officers and directors should respond to a wide
range of future contingencies. Fiduciary duties are the
mechanism invented by the legal system for filling in the
unspecified terms of shareholders‘ contingent contacts. It has
been argued that these duties run exclusively to shareholders
because, as residual claimants, ―[t]he gains and losses from
abnormally good or bad performance are the lot of the
shareholders, whose claims stand last in line.‖12 As Easterbrook
and Fischel have observed:

9 JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 28 (3d ed. 1989).
10 Id. at 29.
11 Id.
12 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 403 (1983), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/725097.
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As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group with the
appropriate incentives . . . to make discretionary decisions. The firm
should invest in new products, plants, etc., until the gains and costs
are identical at the margin. Yet all of the actors, except the
shareholders, lack the appropriate incentives. Those with fixed claims
on the income stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in increased
security) from the undertaking of a new project. The shareholders
receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal
costs. They therefore have the right incentives to exercise discretion
[or to have it exercised on their behalf].13

A simple illustration can be used to demonstrate this point.
Suppose that a firm has two classes of claimants: fixed and
residual. The firm will owe $1 million to the fixed claimants at
the end of period one. Suppose further that the firm has to choose
between two projects: A and B. Both of these projects will require
the firm to allocate one hundred percent of its resources to that
project for the relevant period. Project A has a 0.5 chance of
producing a pay-off with a present value of $1 million, and a 0.5
chance of producing a pay-off with a present value of $5 million
at the end of period one. Thus, the expected present value of
project A is $3 million.14 Project B, on the other hand, has a
pay-off matrix in which there is a 0.5 chance of a pay-off with a
present value of $6 million, and a 0.5 chance of a pay-off with a
present value of $1 million. Thus, while project A has an
expected value of $3 million, project B has an expected value of
$3.5 million.
The shareholders will prefer project B, since they are better
off by $500,000 if they select that project.15 The fixed claimants,
by contrast, are indifferent as to whether the firm selects project
A or project B because under either outcome available under
either project, the fixed claimants are absolutely certain to obtain
the $1 million that is owed to them by the firm. Where a firm is
making a decision like this, the fixed claimants clearly do not
deserve a role in the decision-making process. The firm, and
society, are better off if the firm selects project B, because that is
13 Id.
14 (0.5 x $1 million) + (0.5 x $5 million) = $3 million.
15 Project A has an expected value to the shareholders of $2 million. If the project
only makes $1 million, the fixed claimants will get all of the gains from the project, and
there will be nothing left over for the shareholders. If the project makes $5 million, the
shareholders will get $4 million, because the first million goes to satisfy the firm‘s
obligations to the fixed claimants. Thus, project A has an expected value to the
shareholders of $2 million (0.5 x $4 million = $2 million). Project B has an expected value
of $2.5 million. As before, if the project only makes $1 million, the shareholders get
nothing. If the project makes $6 million, the shareholders will get $5 million, because the
first million will go to the fixed claimants of the firm. Thus, project B has an expected
value to the shareholders of $2.5 million (0.5 x $5 million = $2.5 million).
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the one that maximizes the firm‘s and society‘s stock of wealth.
No purpose is served by giving the firm‘s fixed claimants any
stake in the decision-making process. The only possible result
from involving them would be to permit them to threaten to
obstruct the firm‘s efforts to undertake project B in order to
extract a side payment of some kind.
The sort of decision described in the above example lies
behind the intuition that fiduciary duties should flow exclusively
to a firm‘s shareholders because they are residual claimants.
Because the relevant decision in this example, like so many
decisions made by corporations, is infra-marginal with respect to
all constituencies other than shareholders, the shareholders
should be the only party with legal rights in the process leading
to that decision. And, as Easterbrook and Fischel suggest, the
shareholders‘ position within the firm is unique because
shareholders are the only group with a meaningful stake in every
decision made by a solvent firm.
But not all decisions made by a firm resemble the decision
suggested in the above example. Suppose that the decision was
between project A as described above and a third project, C.
Project C has a 0.5 chance of producing a pay-off at the end of
period one with a present value of $500,000, and a 0.5 chance of
producing a pay-off at the end of period one with a present value
of $10 million. The shareholders would prefer project C to project
A (or project B, for that matter). Project C has an expected return
to shareholders of $4.25 million, which compares favorably with
project A‘s expected return to shareholders of $2 million, and
project B‘s expected return to shareholders of $2.5 million.
However, unlike project A and project B, the firm‘s fixed
claimants are not indifferent with respect to the decision to select
project C. Under project C, there is a 0.5 chance that the fixed
claimants will be paid only half of the full $1 million that is owed
to them. Indeed, the fixed claimants would be willing to pay for
the right to block project C.
It is simply incorrect to say that the shareholders are the
only group with the correct incentives to decide whether to adopt
project C or project A or B. Nor is it the case that the society
benefits by allocating the fiduciary duties within the firm
exclusively to the shareholders on the grounds that the
shareholders have the greatest incentives to maximize the value
of the firm. It is possible to manipulate the numbers in the above
examples—and the actual projects selected in the real world—to
transfer wealth from the fixed claimants to the residual
claimants while reducing rather than increasing the overall
value of the firm.
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Imagine, for example, that the firm is selecting between two
projects: D and E. Project D presents a 0.5 chance of producing
absolutely nothing, and a 0.5 chance of producing a present value
pay-off of $1.5 million at the end of period one. Project E presents
a one hundred percent chance of producing a present value payoff at the end of period one of $1 million. Ex ante, the overall
value of the firm is maximized by selecting project E, since that
produces a present expected value of $1 million, while project D
produces a present expected value of only $750,000. The
shareholders, however, would prefer project D to project E, since
under project E there is no chance that the shareholders will
realize any pay-off at all, while under project D there is a 0.5
chance that the shareholders will realize something (that is,
$500,000 after repaying the $1 million owed to fixed claimants).
Thus, if the shareholders are left in complete control, they will
have incentives ―to adopt various strategies with the effect of
transferring wealth from bondholders to shareholders, such as
choosing risky investment projects and withdrawing assets from
the firm.‖16 This example strongly suggests that some of the
strategies that shareholders can adopt to transfer wealth from
the fixed claimants and other constituencies to themselves
reduce the value of the firm, and overall societal wealth as well.
The point of this discussion is that simply describing
shareholders as residual claimants to the cash flow of the modern
corporation does not fully explain why fiduciary duties flow
exclusively to shareholders.
The shareholders‘ status as residual claimants provides a
persuasive rationale for why their interests should trump with
respect to a wide range of transactions. However, it is also clearly
the case that other claimants have a strong interest in having
their preferences taken into account, at least to some extent, in
decisions about how to allocate corporate resources, because
these claimants face the realistic prospect of tangible loss if their
interests are neglected. Thus, the argument that shareholders, as
residual claimants, have the greatest incentive to maximize the
value of the firm, and therefore should be the beneficiaries of the
legal protection afforded by fiduciary duties, is incomplete. It
does not explain why the interests of other claimants should not
be respected, at least as regards those decisions that have the
potential to affect their interests directly.
The reason that shareholders should be the exclusive
beneficiaries of fiduciary duties does not lie in the fact that the
shareholders are residual claimants, but rather in the fact that
16 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 404.
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fiduciary duties are not public goods. Because fiduciary duties
are not public goods, the enjoyment by one group of the rights
associated with such duties necessarily diminishes other groups‘
ability to enjoy those benefits. This is particularly true in the
case of corporate fiduciary duties where the interests of the
various stakeholders‘ groups actually conflict.
It is well understood that a discretionary decision by
directors that increases the wealth of one stakeholder group often
will diminish the wealth of another group. For example, just as a
decision by a corporate board of directors to increase the overall
riskiness of a firm above the expected level transfers wealth from
fixed claimants to residual claimants, so too does a decision by
the board to reduce the riskiness of the firm transfers wealth to
fixed claimants from residual claimants. But the implication of
this basic point has been lost on those who have supported
statutes that expand the rights of non-shareholder constituencies
to include fiduciary duties.
Another example illustrates this point. Suppose that there
are only two groups of stakeholders: bondholders and
stockholders. The bondholders value the right to be the exclusive
beneficiaries of fiduciary duties at $50, while the shareholders
value the right to be the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary
duties at $75. If fiduciary duties are shared by both groups,
however, the aggregate value of the corporate fiduciary duties
declines to $40 ($20 for each group). If both groups have equal
bargaining power and are rational, the parties will agree that the
shareholders should be the exclusive beneficiaries of the
directors‘ fiduciary duties. The bondholders would accept some
amount greater than $20 in exchange for agreeing that the
shareholders will be the exclusive beneficiaries of the directors‘
fiduciary duties. The shareholders would pay some amount less
than $55 to obtain the right to be the exclusive beneficiaries of
the directors‘ fiduciary duties. Within this range, both groups
would be better off than if fiduciary duties were shared with the
other group. In other words, in this example, as long as the
shareholders pay the bondholders an amount greater than $20
but less than $55, both will be better off than if the fiduciary
duties are shared and no exchange is made. Thus, corporate
shareholders will pay other corporate constituencies for the right
to have these duties inure to their sole benefit.
Suppose, for example, the shareholders place an aggregate
value of $10 million on the legal protection provided by a
corporate governance system that allocates fiduciary duties
exclusively to shareholders, while other constituents place a
value of $2 million on the protection afforded by such duties.
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Under these assumptions, both parties will be better off if the
shareholders are permitted to compensate these other
constituencies—in the form of higher interest on bonds, higher
wages to workers and managers, and better prices for suppliers
and customers—to acquire the right to have fiduciary duties flow
exclusively to them.
Thus, all constituencies will be better off by allocating
fiduciary duties within the firm exclusively to shareholders
because: (1) fiduciary duties are not a public good; and (2)
shareholders are the group within the firm that places the
highest value on such duties.
II. THE TOO MANY MASTERS ARGUMENT
Another
criticism
of
embracing
corporate
social
responsibility is that, to the extent that doing so effects any
change in firm behavior or existing law, it complicates corporate
governance immeasurably. Specifically, embracing corporate
social responsibility requires directors to attempt the impossible:
pleasing a multitude of masters with competing and conflicting
interests. As the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American
Bar Association‘s Section on Business Law has argued in its
position paper on other constituency statutes:
The confusion of directors in trying to comply with such statutes,
if interpreted to require directors to balance the interests of various
constituencies without according primacy to shareholder interests,
would be profoundly troubling. Even under existing law, particularly
where directors must act quickly, it is often difficult for directors
acting in good faith to divine what is in the best interests of
shareholders and the corporation. If directors are required to consider
other interests as well, the decision-making process will become a
balancing act or search for compromise. When directors must not only
decide what their duty of loyalty mandates, but also to whom their
duty of loyalty runs (and in what proportions), poorer decisions can be
expected.17

On one view, the ―too many masters‖ argument is that other
constituency statutes make life more difficult for corporate
managers and boards of directors. In fact, the better view is that
such statutes make life easier rather than harder for incumbent
management of the large, public corporation. After all, these
statutes enable management to justify virtually any decision on
the grounds that it benefits some constituency of the corporation
or other.

17 Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 2269.
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To illustrate the point that other constituency statutes
increase rather than decrease the degree of freedom enjoyed by
incumbent managers, one has only to imagine virtually any
decision or transaction contemplated by a corporation. Take, for
example, the issue of whether a firm should relocate its
headquarters from the large metropolis that has served as its
base for several years to a small town with better schools, lower
labor costs, and lower taxes. While shareholders might benefit by
this move, the community in which the firm is currently located
clearly would suffer. Some employees might benefit by the move,
while others might suffer. The firm could justify virtually any
decision as serving the interests of one or more of the firm‘s
constituencies. Imagine now that the proposal to relocate the
company comes not from incumbent management, but from an
outside bidder who is launching a hostile tender offer for the
company at a substantial premium over the current market price
of the firm‘s shares. Now the other constituency statute can be
used to justify resisting an outside offer that may be in the best
interests of the firm‘s shareholders. This is an additional reason
why other constituency statutes diminish in value when they are
shared by more than one group of stakeholders.
Thus, the primary beneficiaries of other constituency
statutes are incumbent managers who can justify virtually any
decision they make on the grounds that it benefits some
constituency of the firm. Strong support for this assertion lies in
the fact that not only are these statutes (with a single exception)
permissive, they do not afford standing to sue to any of the other
constituencies that they purportedly are designed to benefit.18 A
similar sentiment was expressed by Dean Robert Clark, who has
observed that it is socially optimal for corporate law to promote
the interests of shareholders in profit maximization in a rather
single-minded fashion:
A single objective goal like profit maximization is more easily
monitored than a multiple, vaguely defined goal like the fair and
reasonable accommodation of all . . . interests. Assuming shareholders
have some control mechanisms, better monitoring means that
corporate managers will be kept more accountable. They are more
likely to do what they are supposed to do and do it efficiently.19

Like the argument that other constituency statutes are
ill-advised because they ignore the special status of shareholders
as residual claimants, the ―too many masters‖ argument is not
without merit. Indeed, this argument provides what is a logical
18 Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency
Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163, 165 (1991).
19 ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 20 (1986).
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explanation of state legislatures‘ eagerness to enact these
statutes. As has been pointed out, ―Nonshareholder constituency
statutes . . . are intended to permit consideration of stakeholder
interests, and, at the same time make hostile takeovers more
difficult . . . . [I]t is clear that the corporate managers who
supported these statutes expected them to help protect
incumbent target management.‖20 Of course the winners of the
takeover battles of the 1980s were corporate shareholders, while
the losers were incumbent managers. Other constituency
statutes give such managers the ability to obtain politically what
they were unable to obtain in the marketplace—meaningful job
security regardless of the quality of their performance.
The problem with the ―too many masters‖ argument is that it
is overstated. Corporations traditionally have been able to issue
multiple classes of common and preferred stock, and corporate
managers and directors have owed fiduciary duties to all of these
various classes of claimants simultaneously. Moreover, just as
the interests of common shareholders can conflict with the
interests of non-shareholder constituencies, so too can the
interests of one class of equity claimant conflict with the
interests of another class of equity claimant. In particular,
certain preferred shareholders may have interests that more
closely resemble the interests of fixed claimants than the
interests of common shareholders. Such preferred shareholders
may seek to discourage the firm from engaging in certain risky
projects while the shareholders would support the firm‘s decision
to undertake such projects.
With respect to corporate law jurisprudence, as the
Committee on Corporate Law has observed, in no case has the
all-important Delaware Supreme Court held that directors will
be permitted to prefer the interests of other constituencies over
shareholders or that they ought, as a normative matter, to take
such interests into account.21 The Committee has reformulated
the position of the Delaware Supreme Court to be that
directors have fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders which, while
allowing directors to give consideration to the interests of others,
compel them to find some reasonable relationship to the long-term
interests of shareholders when so doing. In Delaware, this principle is
modified when the decision is made to sell the company, at which time
the directors may consider only the interests of shareholders.22

20 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19
PEPP. L. REV. 971, 996 (1992).
21 See Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 2260.
22 Id. at 2261.
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Another noteworthy facet of the Delaware approach is its
recognition of the important point that over a wide range of
issues, no conflict exists between the interests of other
constituencies and those of shareholders. Acting to improve
worker morale is good for workers and good for shareholders.
Taking steps to improve relations with the local community has
the same effect. Similarly, drafting strong bond covenants or
developing a reputation for dealing fairly with bondholders or
other constituencies benefits the shareholders in the form of
lower interest costs for debt and a lower cost of doing business
generally. However, as a corporation approaches insolvency, the
shareholders‘
interests
become
less
relevant,
and
non-shareholder constituencies take on all of the characteristics
of residual claimants.
Delaware‘s approach recognizes the Hayekian argument that
it generally is not possible to identify precisely which actions are
in shareholders‘ interests and which are not.23 Experimentation
and after-the-fact observation is required. As such, managers
require plenty of latitude for experimentation. In addition, many
technological or managerial improvements to a firm‘s operations
may well result from pure happenstance and fortuity, rather
than careful strategic planning. Consequently, judicial efforts to
hold managers to a strict profit-maximization standard through
the palliative of ex post judicial review of corporate decisions and
operations is not likely to benefit anyone other than the legal
community. The obvious exception to this general rule occurs in
the case where there is a palpable conflict of interest between the
actions of managers and the interests of shareholders. Where
this is the case, there is, of course, an important role played by
judicial enforcement of corporate law norms.
In competitive markets, if managers act in ways that are
sub-optimal from the shareholders‘ perspective, they will be
disciplined, if at all, by the various markets in which such
managers must operate.24 Because of the problems of ignorance
and uncertainty in the world of business, managers often base
their actions on custom, tradition, force of habit, imitating the
actions of more successful competitors, or a complex set of
conflicting motivations. Courts are likely to be even more inept
23 A basic tenet of Austrian economic thought, as exemplified by the work of
Friedrich A. Hayek, is that ―there is an unpredictability and indeterminacy with regard to
human preferences, expectations and knowledge.‖ Israel M. Kirzner, On the Method of
Austrian Economics, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, 48 (Edwin
G. Dolan ed., Sheed & Ward, Inc. 1976); see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND
ECONOMIC ORDER 46 (1948).
24 These markets include the market for corporate control, the internal and external
managerial labor markets, and the markets for the products offered by the firm.
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than managers and directors in determining with any certainty
which actions are in the best interests of shareholders and which
actions are not. As noted above, over a wide range of issues,
allowing managers to take the interests of a variety of
constituencies into account simply recognizes the fact that ex
post second-guessing of managerial decisions probably does more
harm than good. Generally, it is best for all parties concerned if
courts decline to secondguess managers‘ decisions. Only when
such decisions are clearly being made self-interestedly should
courts intrude on the internal process of corporate governance.
To the extent that other constituency statutes are
interpreted in ways that are consistent with this general norm in
corporate law, they will be efficient and will benefit societal
interests, not harm them. Consistent with the approach taken by
the Delaware Supreme Court, the fact that such statutes give
incumbent managers more freedom is worrisome only if
managers can use that freedom in ways that are inconsistent
with shareholder welfare.
Thus, the problem with other constituency statutes is not
that they require managers and directors to serve too many
masters. Under current law, corporate officials must serve a
shifting and highly variegated set of masters. Rather, the
problem is that these statutes potentially permit such managers
and directors to serve no one but themselves.
III. SHAREHOLDERS AS THE GROUP WITH THE MOST ACUTE NEED
FOR FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The real reason why shareholders value fiduciary duties
more than other groups, and why non-shareholder constituency
statutes are unproductive, is that such statutes ignore the severe
contracting problems faced by residual claimants. These acute
contracting problems, coupled with the fact that the value of
being made the beneficiary of corporate fiduciary duties is not in
the nature of a public good, provide the basic justification for the
traditional common law rule that managers and directors owe
their primary fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders.
Outside of insolvency, non-shareholder constituencies can
protect themselves against virtually any kind of managerial
opportunism by retaining negative control over the firm‘s
operations. Workers, bondholders, even local communities, can
protect their interests by contracting for the right to veto future
proposed actions by management. By contrast, the shareholders
must retain positive control over the actions of the firm in order
to realize the full potential value of their shares.
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Merely because non-shareholder constituencies decline to
contract for the right to veto certain corporate transactions does
not mean that they were unable to do so. Rather, the absence of
contractual protection for other constituencies may simply reflect
the fact that such other constituencies were unwilling to pay for
such protection in the form of lower wages or lower interest rates
on debt.
Workers are perhaps the group with which one sympathizes
most when thinking about the possible benefits associated with
other constituency statutes. Unlike shareholders, who are
concerned with the overall profitability of the firm in which they
have invested, workers are concerned with wages, hours, and
working conditions. From a contracting perspective, wages and
hours present few, if any, problems. Workers potentially could
protect their expectations concerning wages with pension
guarantees, severance agreement (golden parachute) contracts,
stipulated cost-of-living adjustments, and other straightforward
provisions. Similarly, workers can obtain credible assurances
against being forced to work undesirable hours simply by
stipulating the precise length of the workday. Employees can
achieve guaranteed working conditions by making reference to a
well-known status quo, and requiring the employer to maintain
working conditions at that level or above.
The point here is not to suggest that workers have the
contracting power to protect their wages, hours, and working
conditions. Rather, the point is simply that, unlike the situation
that pertains to the shareholders, it is at least technologically
possible for workers to protect themselves contractually by
drafting strong contractual provisions in their favor. Moreover, to
the extent that future, unforeseen contingencies arise that cast
doubt on the efficacy of contractual protection, courts can protect
workers by construing their employment contracts in the light of
the original purposes behind the agreement. Thus, the gap-filling
functions provided by modern judges in interpreting contracts
provides workers with the same sorts of protection that fiduciary
duties provide for shareholders.
The above arguments apply with even more force to
bondholders. First, bondholders can and do draft elaborately
detailed contracts to protect themselves from transactions that
upset the original understanding between bondholders and the
firm regarding the sorts of transactions that are appropriate for
the firm.25 For example, bond indentures often contain provisions
25 Clifford W. Smith Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis
of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19 (1979).
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that impose limitations on an issuer‘s ability to pay dividends,
acquire stock, acquire debt or issue preferred stock, either
directly or through a subsidiary, to sell assets, or to engage in
transactions with affiliate companies. While these provisions
would not provide much protection to shareholders (and indeed
might be harmful to their interests), they do much to protect
bondholders and other fixed claimants against wealth transfers
by other corporate interests.
Again, it is worth emphasizing that, for the purposes of the
arguments presented in this paper, the issue is not whether
bondholders have the bargaining power to obtain every
contractual protection they desire when covenants and
indentures are drafted. After all, bondholders, like other
constituencies, are free to decline to invest in the firm if they are
not satisfied with the risk-return trade-off being offered. Instead,
the relevant issue is whether it is technologically possible for the
bondholders to protect themselves via contract.
As such, the only reason we do not observe the use of such
contractual provisions in the real world is that they are
prohibitively expensive. Unlike shareholders who, absent the
gap-filling protection afforded by fiduciary duties, cannot obtain
contractual assurances that a firm will maximize profits,
bondholders can protect the present value of their fixed claims by
drafting ―put‖ provisions that give them the legal right to force
the firm to repurchase the bonds at a pre-determined price upon
the occurrence of certain contingencies. Put provisions may also
require the firm to adjust the payments to fixed claimants to
compensate them for the increased risks associated with certain
transactions or with downgrades in the firm‘s credit rating.
The put provisions accompanying bond sales generally are
triggered by a merger or transfer of a substantial number of
assets to another firm, a change in the ownership of the firm, a
significant share repurchase by the firm, or similar transaction.26
Of course it would be possible to draft even more comprehensive
protection for bondholders. The right to put the bonds back to the
firm might be triggered any time the market price of the bonds
reached a certain level in the open market. Such a broad
provision would be easy to monitor and enforce, and would
provide virtually complete protection for bondholders against
unforeseen contingencies. Thus, to repeat, the issue is not
whether other constituencies can protect themselves via contract,
but whether they are willing to pay for such protection.
26 See Matthew Winkler, Harris, Williams Cos. Unit Are First to Offer Super ‘Poison
Puts,’ WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1988 at C1, C23.
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IV. GAP-FILLING FOR NON-SHAREHOLDER CONSTITUENCIES
The familiar retort to the argument made in the preceding
section is that shareholders and the corporate managers who
serve them are endlessly creative. As such, no matter how
elaborate the guarantees, non-shareholder constituencies will be
unable to protect themselves without the broad-based gap-filling
provided by fiduciary duties because new strategies will be
devised to undermine whatever contractual protection other
constituencies can devise.
An interesting variant on this argument has been made in
an important article by Columbia‘s Professor John Coffee. He
argues that the hostile takeover itself is best viewed as a
shareholder strategy for reneging on the original bargain
between non-shareholder constituencies (particularly managers)
and the firm:
[T]he hostile takeover can be seen not simply as a mechanism that
compels a management to accept that level of business risk that
shareholders deem appropriate, but as a means by which shareholders
outflank the safeguards managers obtained to protect the promises of
deferred compensation and job security [that shareholders have given
to managers]. Thus, what appears from the bidder‘s perspective to be
a process of purging organizational slack looks from the manager‘s
viewpoint more like deceptive reneging on the original
understanding.27

The ex post reneging argument seems flawed for two
reasons. First, as noted above, non-shareholder constituencies
can draft contracts that protect them against the consequences of
future, unforeseen contingencies. Foreseeable contingencies, such
as hostile takeovers and corporate restructuring are even easier
for non-shareholder constituencies to deal with contractually. As
discussed in the preceding section, poison puts for bondholders
and golden parachutes for workers potentially provide virtually
complete protection for non-shareholder constituencies.
Second, it is inaccurate to suggest that absent other
constituency statutes, only shareholders enjoy the protection
afforded by judicial gap-filling. An impressive literature on
relational contracts indicates that modern judges should and do
go a long way towards filling in unstated terms and conditions in
long-term relational contracts such as those forged between
non-shareholder constituencies and public corporations.28
27 John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24 (1986).
28 See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice:
An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 261 (1985).
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Modern courts will examine the nature of the understanding
between two contracting parties and interpret legal disputes
between them in the light of this understanding. Thus,
non-shareholder constituencies (with the exception of local
communities) already enjoy a substantial degree of protection of
the gap-filling sort.
For non-shareholder constituencies, the starting point for
this judicial gap-filling process must be the contract itself. The
contract that constitutes the starting point can take a variety of
forms. It may be an employment agreement, a collective
bargaining agreement, a bond indenture, or a standard form
contract between a firm and its suppliers or customers. For
shareholders, it is widely recognized that the contract between
managers and shareholders establishes that managers have a
duty ―to make corporate decisions so as to maximize the value of
[their] shares.‖29
Fiduciary duties are a corporate governance device uniquely
crafted to fill in the massive gap in this open-ended bargain
between shareholders and corporate officers and directors. On
the basis of the preceding analysis, it should be clear that recent
attempts to expand the scope of managements‘ fiduciary duties to
non-shareholder constituencies are misguided for two reasons
that previously have gone unrecognized. First, to the extent that
such duties are legally enforceable, they shift the focal point of
the legal analysis of the relationship between the
non-shareholder constituency and the firm away from the actual
contract between the parties. In other words, allocating fiduciary
obligations to non-shareholder constituencies takes the judicial
gap-filling process out of its proper framework, which lies in the
actual contract that exists between the constituency and the
firm, and puts it on some other dimension. Removing this
gap-filling from its proper framework deprives judges of any
coherent basis for allocating rights and responsibilities within
the firm.
Inevitably, removing the gap-filling done by judges for
non-shareholder constituencies from a contractual framework to
a fiduciary duty framework creates potential conflicts between
the express and implied terms of the actual bargains and the new
―rights‖ being created by corporate constituency statutes. To the
extent that these new rights are allowed to trump the terms
contained in a contract between a non-shareholder constituency
and the firm, such statutes simply transfer wealth from
29 CLARK, supra note 19, at 17–18; Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific
Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989
DUKE L.J. 173, 186 (1989).
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shareholders to these other constituencies. The specter of such
wealth transfers deprives investors of incentives to invest in
public corporations and reduces societal wealth generally. Thus,
to the extent that other constituency statutes create rights for
non-shareholder groups that are not expressly or impliedly
contained in the actual agreements between these groups and the
firm, they will impede the process of capital formation and
wealth creation in the economy.
V. THE LOCAL COMMUNITY
Local communities constitute a possible exception
to the analysis presented above. Unlike other non-shareholder
constituencies, local communities may have no pre-existing
contractual relationship with the firm on which to base a
reconstruction of the original understanding between the parties
in the event of future conflict. Of course, it often will be the case
that a local community will in fact enter into express
negotiations with a particular firm and agree to provide certain
services and infrastructure support in exchange for a decision by
the firm to locate in that community. In such cases, for the
reasons presented above, layering on a set of fiduciary duties to
the local community in addition to express contracts between the
firm and the community will only hinder the ultimate resolution
of future disputes.
But often there will be no express or implied understanding
between a firm and its community.30 Where there is no
agreement, it seems clear, at least to me, that creating an
amorphous, open-ended fiduciary duty running from the firm to
the ―local community‖ in which the firm operates is a singularly
bad idea. Creating such a duty transforms the role of top
managers of public companies from that of private businessmen
into that of unelected and unaccountable public servants. A
decision to elevate the interests of a local community above the
interests of a firm‘s shareholders is nothing less than a decision
about how to allocate wealth within society. There seems to be a
broad consensus that ―the reallocation of wealth is a function for
which directors are not especially suited and one beyond the
general pale of their perceived mandate from society.‖31

30 See John William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611,
618 (1988) (describing the disruptions caused to the community of Youngstown, Ohio,
when the United States Steel Company closed two plants there).
31 Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 2270; see also Christopher J. Smart,
Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should Be My Brothers’ Keeper?, 1988
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 301, 326–39 (1988).
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As with other non-shareholder constituencies, expanding the
scope of a firm‘s fiduciary duties to include local communities is
simply unnecessary. This is because local communities have
unique access to the political process. To the extent that the
actions of a firm are genuinely harmful to a local community, the
members of that community can appeal to their elected
representatives in state and local government for redress.
Regardless of whether one has a pluralism or a republican
perspective on the governmental process,32 local communities
should be able to mobilize into an effective political coalition to
press for protection from actions by corporations that are truly
harmful to such communities. Indeed, upon reflection, the better
argument seems to be that corporations need protection from
local communities‘ abuse of the political process at least as much
as local communities need protection from opportunistic behavior
by corporations. The political capital being made by local
politicians over the strike at the New York Daily News illustrates
this point nicely. There, politicians have been falling all over
themselves to demonstrate solidarity with the striking Daily
News employees with little or no regard for the substantive
merits of the dispute.
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act33
illustrates the point that local communities are able to protect
themselves in the political process and hardly need any
additional protection that might be afforded by a plant closing
law. The statute requires that, under virtually all conditions,
firms with 100 or more workers give workers and communities
sixty days notice prior to closing a plant. The bill requires that
workers be paid for every day that they are deprived of notice.34
CONCLUSION
The argument that the fiduciary duties of officers and
directors in public corporations should run exclusively to
shareholders and not to other constituencies is an uneasy one. As
shown above, the shareholders‘ unique status as residual
claimants provides a persuasive rationale for allocating fiduciary
duties to shareholders in some but by no means all situations. In
simple terms, in those situations in which other constituencies
have no meaningful stake in a particular decision, they have no
32 For a republican perspective on government, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). For a pluralism critique, see Jonathan R.
Macey, The Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1673 (1988).
33 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012).
34 The statute provides exceptions for businesses struck by unforeseen circumstances
and businesses in dire financial straits. See Elizabeth Wehr, Reagan Bows to Politics on
Plant Closing Bill, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., AUG. 6, 1988, at 2216.
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constructive role to play in the decision-making process.
Including them in such decisions would lead to opportunism and
to a diminution in societal wealth. On the other hand,
non-shareholder constituencies plainly have a significant interest
in a wide range of decisions that a firm may be called upon to
make. Thus the special role of shareholders as residual claimants
does not provide a complete explanation for why shareholders
should be the exclusive beneficiaries of corporate fiduciary
duties.
It is desirable to maintain a system of corporate governance
in which fiduciary duties are owed exclusively to shareholders
because no suitable alternative means of protecting shareholders‘
claims exist other than by way of a judicially enforced regime of
fiduciary duties. By contrast, the obligations owed to other
claimants can be enforced by contract because they are more
precisely defined than the obligations to shareholders.
Moreover, in this article I have stressed that the fiduciary
duties owed to shareholders are a device that serves to fill in the
implied terms of the contract that exists between shareholders
and the firm. This contract requires officers and directors of
corporations to maximize overall firm value for shareholders. The
fiduciary duties owed to shareholders are the only gap-filling
device available to protect shareholders‘ investments, whereas
other claimants enjoy the gap-filling that courts routinely supply
when interpreting the terms of their contracts with the firm.
Allocating fiduciary duties to shareholders does not really give
shareholders a level of protection not enjoyed by non-shareholder
constituencies. Instead, the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders
simply provide the residual claimants with a level of judicial
protection commensurate with the nature of the firm‘s
contractual obligations to them. Ironically, the ostensible reason
for passage of non-shareholder constituency statutes is to provide
such non-shareholder constituents with the enhanced legal
protections that shareholders enjoy. In fact, in the light of the
pervasive conflicts of interest that exist between shareholders
and managers, it seems clear that if any group within the firm is
in need of additional legal protection it is the shareholders.
Instead, the recent wave of non-shareholder constituency
statutes has enhanced the ability of incumbent management to
justify corporate strategies that reduce the overall value of the
firm on the grounds that such strategies benefit some
non-shareholder constituency or other.

Do Not Delete

354

2/25/2014 8:36 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 17:2

